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DUE PROCESS IN SCHOOL DISCIPLINE:
THE EFFECT OF GOSS v. LOPEZ
INTRODUCTION
The importance of education has long been recognized in the
United States. It has been suggested that the right to public educa-
tion is a "fundamental" right' and few would disagree that the
value of a high school diploma is a sine qua non of economic pros-
perity, if not economic survival.2 In recent years, courts have been
faced with the question of whether there does in fact exist a right
to receive a public education, and when and under what circum-
stances can the right be withdrawn. The withdrawal or deprivation
of access to education may take many forms, i.e., racial discrimina-
tion, poverty, geographical or linguistical barriers. One form
receiving a great deal of attention of late is school discipline in the
form of suspension or expulsion of the student from school.
The authority vesting school administrators with the power to
discipline students has deep roots. This power stems from both
statutes and from what the courts have termed inherent power.4
It has always been within the province of school authorities to pro-
vide by regulation for the prohibition and punishment of acts
calculated to undermine the school routine-such authority is neces-
sary and proper.5
The cases discussing the school's power to discipline have repeatedly
focused on two main issues: does the due process clause of the
1. Serrano v. Priest, 5 Cal. 3d 584, 487 P.2d 1241, 96 Cal. Rptr. 604
(1971), cf. San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1
(1973).
2. Sullivan v. Houston Independent School Dist., 333 F. Supp. 1149, 1172
(S.D. Tex. 1971), vacated, 475 F.2d 1071 (5th Cir. 1973).
3. See, e.g., OHno Rsv. CoDE § 1313.66 (1974).
4. See, e.g., Tate v. Bd. of Educ. of Jonesboro, Ark., Special School Dist.,
453 F.2d 975 (8th Cir. 1972), where the court held school authorities have
inherent authority to maintain order and hence have latitude and discretion
in formulating rules and regulations and general standards of conduct.
5. Banks v. Bd. of Pub. Instruc. of Dade County, 314 F. Supp. 285, 289
(S.D. Fla. 1970), vacated, 401 U.S. 988 (1971) (for entry of a fresh decree
so that a timely appeal might be taken), affd, 450 F.2d 1103 (5th Cir. 1971).
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fourteenth amendment apply to education and if so, what procedural
steps must be taken by school authorities to satisfy due process.
Some courts have been reluctant to face the first issue head on.
Instead they have chosen to "assume arguendco" that it did apply
and then proceed to deal with what steps were necessary to satisfy
the due process clause. Courts which have faced the question of
whether the due process clause applies to school disciplinary hear-
ings have held both ways.7 Until recently, the United States Su-
preme Court had declined to hear the issue.8
This changed, however, with the Court's five to four decision in
Goss v. Lopez,9 where the Court held that the due process clause
does apply to school disciplinary proceedings.' 0 This Comment will
analyze Goss and compare it with the case law developed in the
lower courts. The Goss decision dealt only with short term suspen-
sion of students; however, the importance of long term suspension
and expulsion warrants discussion with Goss. While the school
discipline issue affects all forms of educational instruction from the
elementary level to the college and university level, this Comment
is limited to elementary and secondary educational institutions.
DUE PROCESS AND SCHOOL DIscIPLINE
Any discussion of school discipline in light of the due process
clause must begin with an understanding of the type of interest
protected by the due process clause. The fourteenth amendment
provides in part: "No state shall deprive any person of life, liberty,
or property, without due process of law."' " There is little doubt
6. See, e.g., Tate v. Bd. of Educ. of Jonesboro, Ark., Special School Dist.,
453 F.2d 975 (8th Cir. 1972); Farrell v. Joel, 437 F.2d 160 (2d Cir. 1971).
7. For those holding the due process clause applied to school discipli-
nary proceedings see Strickland v. Inlow, 485 F.2d 186 (8th Cir. 1973), va-
cated and remanded, 95 S. Ct. 992 (1975); Dixon v. Alabama State Bd. of
Educ., 294 F.2d 150 (5th Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 930 (1961); De
Jesus v. Penberthy, 344 F. Supp. 70 (D. Conn. 1972). Those finding the due
process clause did not apply, see Murray v. West Baton Rouge Parish School
Bd., 472 F.2d 438 (5th Cir. 1973); Dunn v. Tyler, 460 F.2d 137 (5th Cir. 1972).
8. See, e.g., Linwood v. Bd. of Educ., City of Peoria, 463 F.2d 763 (7th
Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1027 (1972); Dixon v. Alabama State Bd.
of Educ., 294 F.2d 150 (5th Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 930 (1961).
9. 95S. Ct. 729 (1975).
10. Id. at 737.
11. U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV, § 1.
that school disciplinary proceedings constitute state action within
the terms of the fourteenth amendment. 12 Given state action,
whether any procedural protection is due depends on the nature
of the interest involved. The interest must be one within the con-
templation of "liberty" or "property" language of the fourteenth
amendment.'3
To have a property interest in a benefit, a person clearly must
have more than an abstract need or desire for it. He must have
more than a unilateral expectation of it. He must, instead, have
a legitimate claim of entitlement to it.14
While the right to education is not a fundamental right under
the United States Constitution,15 the right to education may still
receive due process protection. Forty-eight states have provisions
in their constitutions for public education. The same states have
compulsory attendance laws which require school attendance for
eight years or more.' 6 These states have voluntarily created a right
to education. As Mr. Justice Marshall stated in his dissent in San
Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez,17 no other state
function is so uniformly recognized. With the states having enacted
these compulsory attendance laws, it would appear the student has
a "legitimate claim of entitlement to" education. Accordingly, he
should be entitled to protection of this state-created right under
the due process clause.' 8
The United States Supreme Court has not defined with exactness
the "liberty" guaranteed by the fourteenth amendment but has
held:
[I] t denotes not merely freedom from bodily restraint but also the
right of the individual to contract, . . . to acquire useful knowl-
edge, ... and generally to enjoy those privileges long recognized
... as essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free men.19
Under this broad definitional pronouncement and with the claim
to education a student possesses under state law, it has been held
that the right to public education is both a "liberty"20 and a
12. See Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954); West Virginia State
Bd. of Educ. v. Barnett, 319 U.S. 624, 637 (1943), where the Court held
"[t]he fourteenth amendment, as now applied to the states, protects the
citizen against the state itself and all its creatures-boards of education not
excepted." See also Bouse v. Hipes, 319 F. Supp. 515 (S.D. Ind. 1970).
13. Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972).
14. Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972).
15. San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
16. Id. at 112 n.68 (dissenting opinion).
17. 411 U.S. at 1. See text accompanying notes 67-71 infra.
18. San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
19. Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923).
20. Lopez v. Williams, 372 F. Supp. 1279 (S.D. Ohio 1973), aff'd, 95 S.
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"property" 21 interest requiring due process protection.
The determination of whether school suspension or expulsion pro-
ceedings pass constitutional muster involves a two-step analysis.
The first step is to determine whether the right affected by the
school proceeding is a protected right under the Constitution. This
determination does not involve a weighing process. 22 If the right
affected is a "liberty" or a "property" right, due process protection
in some form is required before that right can be withdrawn.
"[W]hether due process requirements apply in the first place, we
must look not to the 'weight' but to the nature of the interest at
stake."23 In light of the fundamental character of the entitlement
to education 24 it can be well said that the right to education is con-
stitutionally protected.
The second step of the analysis involves the resolution of what
procedure is necessary to satisfy due process. At this point the
weighing process is proper.25 With respect to what will satisfy the
due process clause, all aspects of procedural due process have been
discussed in school discipline cases including a student's right to
counsel,2 6 the right of confrontation and cross-examination of ad-
verse witnesses,2 7 notice of specific charges,28 and the right to
appeal. 29 One basic question,' however, lies at the center of this
controversy and that is whether a hearing is necessary before the
Ct. 729 (1975).
21. Farrell v. Joel, 437 F.2d 160 (2d Cir. 1971).
22. In discussing the nature of the right to education some courts have
relied on a balancing test to resolve the question of whether due process
has any application to school discipline. The court in Banks v. Bd. of Pub.
Instruc. of Dade County, 314 F. Supp. 285 (S.D. Fla. 1970), held it was im-
portant to weigh and contrast the gravity of rights involved with the inter-
est of the state in maintaining discipline in the education system. The
court's reliance on the balancing test is misplaced: it is immaterial what
the gravity of the right is so long as the right is one found either to be
a "liberty" or a "property" right.
23. Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 570-71 (1972).
24. See text accompanying notes 11-21 supra.
25. See note 22 supra..
26. Madera v. Bd. of Educ. of City of New York, 386 F.2d 778 (2d Cir.
1967).
27. De Jesus v. Penberthy, 344 F. Supp. 70 (Conn. 1972).
28. Williams v. Dade County School Bd., 441 F.2d 299 (5th Cir. 1971).
29. Linwood v. Bd. of Educ., City of Peoria, 463 F.2d 763 (7th Cir. 1972)
cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1027 (1972).
student is suspended or expelled. There is general agreement
among the courts that a distinction exists, with respect to what
procedure will satisfy due process, between expulsion or long-term
suspension 0 and short-term suspension.3 1 In expulsion cases mod-
em courts have uniformly held some type of hearing is necessary. 2
Students facing suspension have not found this same uniformity
with respect to a hearing prior to their suspension.
The leading case until Goss dealing with the due process issue
in school was Dixon v. Alabama State Board of Education.3 While
Dixon dealt with a college student, it has been cited as authority
in numerous elementary and secondary school cases. In Dixon, the
court was faced with the expulsion of a black college student for
participating in a "sit-in" at a white lunch counter. There was no
notice of the school's intention to expel nor was there a hearing
regarding it. The court held the due process clause applied to
expulsion from the state college and went on to state that "the
minimum procedural requirement necessary to satisfy due process
depends upon the circumstances and the interest of the parties
involved. '5 4 The Dixon court considered the relative interest of
the student on the one hand and the college on the other and found
that the power of the government to expel is not unlimited and
cannot be arbitrarily exercised. The possibility of arbitrary action
is not excluded by the existence of reasonable regulations. There
may be arbitrary application of the rule to the facts of a particular
case, such a result is inevitable when the board hears only one side
of the issue.3 5
The court then set forth the following five standards which it
felt would decrease the possibility of arbitrary decisions and afford
the student minimum due process protection:
1. Notice of specific charges and grounds against the student.
2. A hearing, the nature of which should vary depending upon the
circumstances of the particular case.
3. The student should be given the names of the witnesses against
30. Expulsion is a final separation from an institution, and suspension
is a temporary one. John B. Stetson Univ. v. Hunt, 88 Fla. 510, 102
So. 637 (1924). The phrase short-term suspension is used in reference to
separation from school for ten days or less.
31. Lee v. Macon County Bd. of Educ., 490 F.2d 458 (5th Cir. 1974), where
the court stated that "[w]hen a serious penalty is at stake a school board
must provide a higher degree of due process than when the student is
threatened only with a minor sanction." Id. at 460.
32. See, e.g., De Jesus v. Penberthy, 344 F. Supp. 70 (D. Conn. 1972).
33. 294 F.2d 150 (5th Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 930 (1961).
34. Id. at 155.
35. Id. at 157.
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him and an oral or written report on the facts to which each
witness testifies.
4. The student should be given an opportunity to present his own
defense against the charges.
5. If the hearing is not before the Board directly, the results and
findings of the hearing should be presented in a report open to
the student.8 6
These standards while varied to certain degrees in the cases fol-
lowing Dixon, have nonetheless formed the basis of the due process
law with respect to school disciplinary hearings. The Dixon stand-
ard requiring a hearing left the nature of the hearing to be
determined by the facts of each individual case. Much of the -liti-
gation in this area has been directed at this issue: given the facts,
was the "hearing" provided adequate?37
THE HEARING
A hearing should serve two functions. First, it should determine
whether or not the student in fact did the act he is alleged to have
committed. Second, it must designate the appropriate discipline in
light of the offense committed.
The hearings employed by various schools range from a willing-
ness to answer questions from the students after they were
informed they had been suspended" to a "full-dress" formal hear-
ing with counsel present.39 Whether a student receives a formal
hearing or an informal conference and whether the type of hearing
provided will satisfy due process in a particular case depends on
two factors. The factors arise out of the hearing's functions and
create a floating scale due process.40 The first is that the greater
the degree to which the material facts surrounding the event are
in dispute the more extensive and important the fact finding func-
36. Id. at 158-59.
37. See, e.g., Baker v. Downey City Bd. of Educ., 307 F. Supp. 517 (C.D.
Cal. 1969).
38. Tate v. Bd. of Educ. of Jonesboro, Ark. Special School Dist., 453 F.2d
475 (8th Cir. 1972).
39. Linwood v. Bd. of Educ., City of Peoria, 463 F.2d 763 (7th Cir. 1972),
cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1027 (1972). The hearing in Linwood involved the
expulsion of a student. It was held before a local attorney who had been
appointed as a hearing officer. A court reporter was present and the stu-
dent was represented by counsel with cross-examination of adverse wit-
nesses allowed.
40. See Cafeteria Workers Local 473 v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886, 895 (1961).
tion of the hearing becomes.41 As the court in Bett v. Board of
Education, City of Chicago42 stated:
Since the student admitted setting false alarms [the misconduct
with which she was charged] the function of procedural protection
in insuring a fair and reliable determination of the retrospective
factual question whether she in fact did it is not essential.43
The student need not admit his wrongdoing for the fact finding
aspect of the hearing to become less important.
The classical situation arises when the misconduct takes place in
front of the school official vested with the authority and duty to
discipline the students. Here, a determination of the facts and
whether the student violated the rule would be a needless step in
the disciplinary process.44 This, however, is not the typical situa-
tion. Rather, in the usual situation the misconduct will take place
in front of other students, teachers, or go unobserved. In this con-
text, the disciplinarian will not have firsthand knowledge of the
facts and the fact finding aspect of the hearing is of utmost
importance and requires a more formal approach. 45
Another type of activity which may result in suspension or expul-
sion arises in connection with a student's off-campus conduct. A
factual situation presented in several cases involves demonstrations
by students off campus resulting in their arrest.40 Basing a suspen-
sion or expulsion on the mere fact of an arrest, does not meet the
due process requirement of a fact finding hearing because so doing
assumes that the conduct which resulted in the arrest was of a type
which schoof officials have authority to punish even though it did
not take place on campus. In each of the situations mentioned
above a transmission of facts or evidence to the disciplinary officials
must occur. The accuracy of the transmission and the credibility
of the person transmitting the information raises issues which can
only be adequately tested if the student has an opportunity to
present his side of the story.47
41. See, e.g., Bett v. Bd. of Educ. of the City of Chicago, 466 F.2d 629
(7th Cir. 1972).
42. Id.
43. Id. at 633.
44. See Farrell v. Joel, 437 F.2d 460 (2d Cir. 1971).
45. De Jesus v. Penberthy, 344 F. Supp. 70 (D. Conn. 1972).
46. See Dixon v. Alabama State Bd. of Educ., 294 F.2d 450 (5th Cir.
1961); Hobson v. Bailey, 309 F. Supp. 1393 (W.D. Tenn. 1970).
47. The need for some type of fact finding hearing is revealed all too
clearly in the case of Strickland v. Inlow, 485 F.2d 486 (8th Cir. 1973), va-
cated and remanded, 95 S. Ct. 992 (1975), where three students were sus-
pended without a hearing for possession and use of intoxicating liquors.
The students, in a homemaking class, "spiked" (24 oz. of malt liquor in
a gallon and a half of punch) the punch being served at a school party.
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SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW
Assuming the officials have firsthand knowledge or the student
admits to the charges, the lack of disputed facts should not
eliminate the need for a hearing. The hearing need not be as exten-
sive as one requiring a fact finding, but it should at least provide
the student with an opportunity to explain the circumstances
surrounding the conduct.48 Where the type of discipline resulting
from the misconduct is discretionary, due process requires the
student or parent have some opportunity to present a mitigative
argument.
4 9
The second function of a hearing is to determine the type of
punishment appropriate in the factual context before the school
official vested with the power to discipline.50 Arising from this
second function is the second factor in the determination of what
procedure, i.e., formality of hearing, will satisfy due process. As
the sanction involved moves from a short suspension to expulsion,
the nature of the hearing necessary to satisfy due process becomes
more formal.51 Accordingly, the same degree of formality will not
be required in a case involving a two-day suspension as that involv-
ing expulsion. 52 Few courts have required a formal criminal-type
The quantity of liquor involved was not presented to the school board. The
board's action found no finding had been made that the punch was intoxi-
cating, in fact, no evidence on that point was even before the board when it
made its decision.
48. Bett v. Bd. of Educ. of the City of Chicago, 466 F.2d 629 (7th Cir.
1972). The court recognized that ".... due process may also contemplate
affording the plaintiff an opportunity to be heard on the question of what
discipline is warranted by the identified offense." Id. at 633.
49. Id. at 629.
50. This official can be the classroom teacher, school principal, board of
education or any one of the superintendents or assistant superintendents.
51. 463 F.2d at 768.
52. Cf. Shanley v. Northeast Independent School Dist. of Bexar County,
Texas, 462 F.2d 960 (5th Cir. 1972).
[Tihe magnitude of a penalty should be gauged by its effect upon
the student and not simply meted out by formula. [A] suspension
of even one hour could be quite critical to an individual student
if that hour encompassed a final exam that provides for no 'make-
up.' Id. at 967 n.4.
While in some cases injustice may result from a less formal hearing con-
cerning a suspension, the interest at stake must be balanced against the bur-
den imposed on school officials if a formal hearing was required for short
periods of suspension. See generally, Ferguson v. Thomas, 430 F.2d 852
(5th Cir. 1970). "The sufficiency of procedures employed in any particular
situation must be judged in the light of the parties, the subject matter and
the circumstances involved." Id. at 856.
hearing even in expulsion cases.5 3 Most courts dealing with expul-
sion have chosen to follow the type of hearing that was used in
Dixon, one with no attorney present and no confrontation or cross-
examination of adverse witnesses.54 Those courts facing short-term
suspension cases have found compliance with the due process clause
in a variety of ways, including; a conference with the student or
parent wherein an explanation is given, 55 partial compliance with
Dixon,50 full compliance with Dixon,57 or no hearing held at all.5 s
The effect of Dixon was to bring to the attention of the courts
and students that due process protection was needed and appro-
priate in school discipline proceedings. Dixon notwithstanding,
there existed a need for a definitive resolution of the question of
whether the right to a public education was a protected right under
the due process clause, one which, in all situations, needed some
type of procedural due process protection, not just in expulsion or
long suspension cases.
Goss v. Lopez: TRE COURT FACES THE SCHOoL/DuE PROCESS ISSUE
Against this background, the United States Supreme Court
handed down its five to four decision in Goss v. Lopez on January
22, 1975.59 Mr. Justice White, writing the opinion for the majority,
affirmed a lower three-judge ruling that students who were
suspended without a hearing prior to suspension or within a reason-
able time thereafter were denied due process of law.60 The Goss
case was brought as a class action with nine named plaintiffs. The
named plaintiffs were Ohio public high school students who had
been suspended from school for misconduct for up to ten days. The
suspended students and the class they represented sought a declara-
tion that the Ohio statute permitting such suspensions was uncon-
stitutional and an order compelling school officials to remove
reference to the suspension from the students' records. The Ohio
statute provided in part that:
53. See Linwood v. Bd. of Educ., City of Peoria, 463 F.2d 763 (7th Cir.
1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1027 (1972).
54. 294 F.2d at 159.
55. Baker v. Downey City Bd. of Educ., 307 F. Supp. 517 (C.D. Cal. 1969).
See also Madera v. Bd. of Educ. of the City of New York, 386 F.2d 778
(2d Cir. 1967).
56. See Pervis v. Lamarque Independent School Dist., 466 F.2d 1054
(5th Cir. 1972).
57. Banks v. Bd. of Pub. Instruc. of Dade County, 314 F. Supp. 285, 292
(S.D. Fla. 1970), af-'d, 450 F.2d 1103 (5th Cir. 1971).
58. Jackson v. Hepinstall, 328 F. Supp. 1104 (N.D.N.Y. 1971).
59. 95 S. Ct. 729 (1975).
60. Lopez v. Williams, 372 F. Supp. 1279 (S.D. Ohio 1973).
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[Tlhe principal of a public school may suspend a pupil from school
for not more than ten days. Such ... principal shall within
twenty-four hours after the expulsion or suspension notify the
parent or guardian of the child, and the clerk of the board of
education in writing of such expulsion or suspension including the
reasons therefore.61
The statute goes on to provide a procedure for appealing expulsions
but no procedure is provided for suspended students. The appel-
late procedure consists of a hearing before the board of education.
The misconduct for which the students were suspended arose out
of racial unrest at Marion-Franklin High which for the most part
consisted of disruptions during various assemblies and homeroom
periods. Each student was summarily suspended with a letter be-
ing sent home to inform the students' parents of their suspension.
It appears from the facts that in each case the official issuing the
suspension had firsthand knowledge of the misconduct involved. 62
The lower court held that the state-created entitlement to an
education was a liberty protected by the due process clause of
the fourteenth amendment. 8 Athough the court recognized that
school officials are better suited to make decisions affecting their
institutions, it nonetheless felt constitutionally bound to insure that
the student be afforded the minimum procedural process mandated
by the Constitution.64 The court then set forth the minimum pro-
cedural requirements necessary to satisfy due process in the
temporary suspension situation where a need for immediate re-
moval of the student is presented. When such a need arises and
the student is removed, the school must:
1. Send written notice of the removal to the student and parents
of the reason(s) for the removal and the proposed suspension
within twenty-four hours after removal.
2. Not later than seventy-two hours after the actual removal, the
student and his parents must be given an opportunity to be pre-
sent at a hearing before a school administrator who will deter-
mine if a suspension should be imposed.
61. Id. at 1282.
62. Id. at 1284-91. There appears one exception to this in the case of
plaintiff Betty Crome who was suspended after being arrested on her way
home from school. The arrest occurred at a junior high at which Ms. Crome
had stopped. She was released without charges being filed but the next
morning received a letter informing her she had been suspended.
63. Id. at 1300.
64. Id. at 1301.
3. The hearing is not a judicial proceeding, but must provide at a
minimum: -
a. statements in support of the charges;
b. statements by the student and others in defense of the
charges and/or in mitigation or explanation of his conduct;
c. the administrator is not required to permit the presence of
counsel or follow any prescribed judicial rules in conducting
the hearing.65
The Supreme Court affirmed the lower court, at least in theory.00
In doing so, however, it limited the procedure necessary to satisfy
due process.
Due Process is Required in School Disciplinary Proceedings
The Court first turned to the issue faced many times before in
the lower courts as to whether or not the due process clause applied
to school disciplinary proceedings. The school officials contended
that because there was no constitutional right to an education, the
due process clause did not protect against expulsion from the public
school system.6 7 The Court first discussed the right to education
as being a property interest.
Protected interests in property are normally 'not created by the
Constitution. Rather, they are created and their dimensions are
defined' by an independent source such as the state statutes or
rules entitling the citizen to certain benefits. 08
Since the students had a legitimate claim of entitlement to a public
education under Ohio law,69 the Court held, "Ohio may not with-
draw that right on grounds of misconduct absent fundamentally
fair procedures to determine whether the misconduct has oc-
curred."7 0
[T]he State is constrained to recognize a student's legitimate en-
tiltlement to a public education as a property interest which is pro-
tected by the Due Process Clause and which may not be taken
away for misconduct without adherence to the minimum proce-
dures required by that clause.71
Basing the student's property interest in education upon a state
statute would appear to limit due process protection to students
residing in states having compulsory attendance laws. This pre-
sents no problem except for students in Mississippi and South
65. Id. at 1302.
66. 95 S. Ct. at 729.
67. Id. at 735. See also San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodri-
guez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
68. 95 S. Ct. at 735, citing Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577
(1972).
69. Omo REv. CODE §§ 3313.48, 3313.64 (1974).
70. 95 S. Ct. at 736.
71. Id.
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Carolina where no compulsory attendance exists.72  Even as to
these students, due process applies because the Court found that
charges of misconduct resulting in suspension from school, if
sustained and recorded, could "seriously damage the students'
standing with their fellow pupils and their teachers as well as inter-
fere with later opportunities for higher education and employ-
ment."73 Referring to the due process clause protection of liberty,
the Court found that where a person's good name, reputation,
honor, or integrity was at stake because of governmental action,
the minimum requirements of due process must be satisfied. 74
Minimum Procedures are Established
Having found that the due process clause applied to the *right
to public education, the Court faced the question of what minimum
procedures were necessary to satisfy the clause. School officials
argued that due process did not come into play until a student was
subjected to severe detriment or grievous loss. 75 The Court rejec-
ted the school's argument, turning to Sniadach v. Family Finance
Corp.76 for the proposition that as long as a property deprivation
is not de minimis, its gravity is irrelevant to the question whether
account must be taken of the due process clause. "A ten-day sus-
pension from school is not de minimis in our view and may not
be imposed in complete disregard of the due process clause. '7 7 The
'Court, finding that a fundamental requisite of due process of law
was a hearing and being informed of that hearing, held a student
facing suspension must be given some kind of notice and afforded
some kind of hearing.78
72. San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 112
n.68 (1973).
73. 95 S. Ct. at 736.
74. Id. The due process clause forbids arbitrary deprivations of liberty.
Such deprivation may result where the student's school records reflect that
he has been suspended. As noted by the Court, four of twelve randomly
selected Ohio colleges specifically inquire of the high school of every appli-
cant for admission whether the applicant has ever been suspended. Id. at
736 n.7. It is this type of blemish on the student's reputation which the
Court seeks to protect by requiring minimal due process.
75. 95 S. Ct. at 736. See also Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath,
341 U.S. 123, 168 (1951).
76. 395 U.S. 337, 342 (1969).
77. 95 S. Ct. at 737.
78. Id. at 738.
The procedures the Court found that would satisfy due process
in the case of a suspension of ten days or less, consist of oral or
written notice of the charges presented to the student and if he
denies them, he must receive an explanation of the evidence the
authorities have and an opportunity to present his side of the story.70
The hearing need not be held prior to removal of the student. Such
is the case where the student's presence poses a danger to persons
or property. Likewise, if the student continues to disrupt the
academic process he may be immediately removed from school.80
The Court did not find that the due process clause required the
student be represented by counsel or to confront and cross-examine
adverse witnesses, nor to call his own witness, at least in the case
of a short suspension.81 While not requiring these elements, the
Court did not prohibit their use in the proper circumstances. It
vested the school disciplinarian with the discretion to summon the
accuser, permit cross-examination and allow the student to call his
own witnesses. In more difficult cases the school disciplinarian may
permit counsel.8 2  In requiring the school official to afford the
student notice and a hearing, the court sought to give the student
an opportunity to alert the official to the existence of disputed facts
concerning the misconduct. Where no disputed facts exist, the stu-
dent should be given an opportunity "to characterize his conduct
and put it in what he deems the proper context."88  Finally, the
Court specifically left open the possibility that longer suspensions
or expulsions may require more formal procedures.8 4
THE EFFECT OF Goss
In the eyes of the four dissenting justices,8 5 the Goss decision
represents an "unprecedented intrusion into the process of elemen-
tary and secondary education ..... 86 The practical effect of
Goss, however, on daily school disciplinary proceedings will be
insignificant.87 While the court resolved the long-standing question
79. Id. at 740.
80. Id. See also Banks v. Bd. of Pub. Instruc. of Dade County, 314 F.
Supp. 285, 291 (S.D. Fla. 1970) affd, 450 F.2d 1103 (5th Cir. 1971), where the
court suggests a hearing prior to suspension in every case would itself have
a disruptive effect on the educational process.
81. 95 S. Ct. at 740.
82. Id. at 741.
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Justice Powell, Justice Blackmun, Justice Rehnquist and the
Chief Justice.
86. 95 S. Ct. at 741 (dissenting opinion).
87. The Goss standard is not new to school officials. They voluntarily
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of whether the due process clause was applicable to school disci-
pline, the minimum standard established by the Court is too general
to have any major effect on the schools. It is not suggested that
the Court erred in its decision: quite the contrary. The recognition
that a student faced with "short-term suspensions" is entitled to
some type of hearing was long overdue. The Court, as the dissent
points out, "[i]n its rush to mandate a constitutional rule,...
appears to give no weight to the practical manner in which suspen-
sion problems normally would be worked out under Ohio law. 881
Likewise, it does not appear that the Court gave due regard to the
numerous lower courts having faced the school discipline issue.
To reach the minimum standard established, the Court balanced
the interest of the school officials against the interests of the
student. School officials faced with numerous suspensions each
year89 cannot be required to provide a formal hearing prior to every
suspension. Yet the student facing suspension is not concerned
with the burden a hearing requirement has on school officials; his
concern is focused on the omitted classroom instruction, the missed
exams given during his involuntary absence, the voluminous
amount of make-up work required to catch up with the class, and
the effect the suspension will have on his opportunities to higher
education and employment. Should the suspension be imposed er-
roneously, the student has suffered a great injustice, due in part
to a policy which appears to favor less formality in school discipline.
The Court limits itself in its balancing process, finding on one
hand that the risk of error resulting in unfair or mistaken expul-
sion from educational process is not all trivial. On the other hand,
this risk should be guarded against, if it may be done without pro,
employ it in most situations. As pointed out by the district court, the usual
procedures followed at Marion-Franklin High School, which the parties
herein attended, involved a greater fact finding hearing than required by
the court. Lopez v. Williams, 372 F. Supp. 1279, 1283 (S.D. Ohio 1973). The
problem is not that school officials do not have the means or are not aware
of the problems surrounding suspension cases. The problem is that officials
do not always proceed in the "usual way" or "fair" way. If the officials at
Marion-Franklin had, the students in Goss would probably not have been
suspended.
88. 95 S. Ct. at 747 (dissenting opinion).
89. Id. at 745 n.10. "An amicus brief filed by the Children's Defense
Fund states that at least 10% of the junior and senior high school students
in the States sampled were suspended one or more times in the 1972-73
school year." Id.
hibitive cost or interference with the educational process. 0° Within
this framework the Court finds equilibrium between the two
interests in requiring the disciplinarian to seek out the student,
obtain his side of the story and then render his decision on whether
to suspend the student or not. As was pointed out by the Court:
[F] airness can rarely be obtained by secret, one sided determination
of the facts decisive of rights.... No better instrument has been
devised for arriving at truth than to give a person in jeopardy of
serious loss notice of the case against him and opportunity to
meet it.91
The Court provides this instrument to the student in a most basic
form: one where only the student is informed of the alleged viola-
tion, without knowing the identity of his accuser, and without
means to seek review of the school officials' decision. While the
Court's minimum standard may be adequate for suspensions of
extremely short duration, in light of this potential harm to the
student, it is not adequate for a suspension of longer duration. 2
AN EXPANSION OF Goss: A PROPOsED NEW STANDARD
If suspended for a short period of time, a student can make up
missed lessons. Likewise, he is not so far behind his classmates
as to place a burden on the teacher in helping him catch up. As
the duration of the suspension increases, however, the potential
harm to a student, in terms of missed lessons, becomes greater. As
the potential harm to the student increases, the procedure essential
to justify the harm should become more formal, and if necessary
more burdensome on school officials.0 3
Many lower courts, in reviewing school discipline proceedings,
adopted a test of basic fairness to determine whether the student
was accorded due process.94 A court must not lose sight of this
goal of fairness when the balancing process is entered into. If, to
insure fairness to the student, a formal hearing is required prior
to a short suspension, then that result must be reached in the
90. Id. at 739.
91. Id., quoting from Anti-Fascist Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 170-
72 (1931).
92. See cases cited note 52 supra; ef. 95 S. Ct. at 743 (dissenting opin-
ion).
93. Thestudent absent from school for more than a couple of days faces
several problems. First, he has missed foundational material upon which
the lessons presented on his return are based. Second, he must make up
work missed plus prepare the work assigned when his suspension ends. In-
terview with John Westrick, Principal of Lakeside Jr. High School, in Lake-
side, California, March 11, 1975.
, 94. E.g., Banks v. Bd. of Pub. Instruc. of Dade County, 314 F. Supp. 285
(S.D. FIla. 1970), affd, 450 F.2d 1103 (5th Cir. 1971).
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balancing process. Attempting to balance two somewhat adverse
interests and arrive at a fair result is not a simple task. The Goss
Court set forth what it determined to be a procedure that would
insure a fair result to the student without placing an undue burden
on school officials. Using as a foundation the principles established
in Goss, this commentator suggests a new minimum standard to
counterbalance the potential harm which may result from a suspen-
sion.
The Goss Court held that prior to any suspension, the minimum
procedure which it established must be followed. The Court left
open the possibility that more formal proceedings may be required
in certain circumstances.9 5 A circumstance which would warrant a
more formal procedure than the Goss standard is presented in the
suspension of a student for a period in excess of three days.96 There
is no magic in the three-day cut-off period and it is recognized that
attempting to establish a fixed time -limit leads to many problems.
However, for the sake of discussion, the three-day cut-off is adopted.
The Initial Hearing
Suspensions in excess of three days present a situation where the
potential injury to the student increases each day absent from
school. In such cases more is required by way of minimum
procedures to satisfy the due process clause.97 The school disci-
plinarian, faced with information of conduct which may warrant
suspension of the student, must seek out and confront the student
with the charges against him. If the student indicates the charges
are accurate, he should be given an opportunity to explain his con-
duct if he so desires. If the student denies the charge or presents
facts different from those first reported to the school official, the
95. 95 S. Ct. at 741.
96. See Dunn v. Tyler Independent School Dist., 460 F.2d 137 (5th Cir.
1972), where the court approved a school district regulation requiring writ-
ten notice and a hearing for suspensions in excess of three days.
97. The Goss Court did not limit school officials to the minimum proce-
dure it established. It expressly provided that once the disciplinarian is
alerted to the existence of disputed facts "[h] e may then determine himself
to summon the accuser, permit cross-examination and allow the student to
present his own witnesses." 95 S. Ct. at 741. If in each case involving a
greater than three day suspension, such a determination would, in fact, be
made there would be no need for a new standard.
official must make two initial determinations. The first is whether
the charges, if sustained, would result in a suspension of the student
for a period in excess of three days. If it would not, the official
has satisfied due process, having adhered to the Goss standard.98
If the possible suspension would exceed three days, the official
must next determine if the student's continued presence at school
would disrupt the educational process. In such a situation, the
student may be immediately removed from school but a hearing
must follow as soon as reasonably possible after the suspension.09
Absent emergency circumstances, the student may remain at school
until the individual who initially supplied the facts concerning the
student's conduct can be summoned before the official. The two
then should go over the initial report in light of the student's denial
or statement of different facts. The student need not be present
during this conference. At this point, the official, having confirmed
the accusations after confronting the student and securing his state-
ment, is free to resolve any discrepancies and determine whether
to suspend the student or not.100
Notice to the Parents of the Suspension
One of the most essential requirements in any suspension situa-
tion and one which the majority in Goss failed to discuss, is notice
of the suspension to the student's parents.10'
In virtually all cases surveyed, notice of the suspension was given
to the parents. The failure of the majority in Goss to require some
type of notice to the parent that their child had been suspended
and the reasons for same is a major shortcoming of the decision.
As the dissent points out, the Ohio statute which the majority'found
unconstitutional required, "written notice including the 'reasons
therefor' to the student's parents and to the Board of Education
within 24 hours of any suspension.' 0 2
98. The fact that the suspension would not exceed three days does not
limit the official to merely confronting the student. See Dunn v. Tyler In-
dependent School Dist., 460 F.2d 137 (5th Cir. 1972).
99. Pervis v. Lamarque Independent School Dist., 466 F.2d 1054 (5th Cir.
1972).
100. It has been suggested that an impartial official should determine
whether to suspend or not. See Linwood v. Bd. of Educ., City of Peoria,
463 F.2d 763 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1027 (1972); Farrell v.
Joel, 437 F.2d 160 (2d Cir. 1971).
101. Notice should always be given to the child's parents when a suspen-
sion is issued against the student, no matter how short the suspension period
is. See Hudgins, The Discipline of Secondary School Students and Proce-
dural Due Process, A Standard, 7 WAKE FOREST L. R=. 32, 46 (1971).
102. 95 S. Ct. at 747 (dissenting opinion).
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One explanation for the majority's omission to require such notice
is that the notice to the parent is not necessary prior to the official
conducting the fact finding hearing. This action would appear con-
sistent with the majority's attempt to balance the respective
interests of the parties within its appointed framework of noninter-
ference with the educational process. Balancing the benefit the
student might receive from having his parents present at the initial
fact finding hearing with the tremendous burden it would place on
school disciplinary proceedings, the majority's lack of requiring
same is consistent with due process and basic fairness. The
student's parent would most likely have no knowledge of the facts
surrounding the alleged wrongful conduct. The main function of
informing the parents of the suspension is to insure that the estab-
lished due process procedures are followed in the school official's
determination to suspend the student.1 08
Review of the Initial Proceeding
The problem of denial of due process in school disciplinary pro-
ceedings is not that officials are unfamiliar with the procedures
required under the due process clause, but rather the lack of
regular application of these procedures.' 0 4  One method which
would help insure that procedural due process is complied with in
any given situation is to provide the student with a means of attain-
ing a review of the school disciplinarian's action. 05 In not all cases
will review be necessary or desired by the student or his parents.10
Accordingly, to require that a review be automatic in all cases
would be a superfluous and wasteful practice. Where, however,
the student is desirous of a review, it should be obligatory on the
school district to provide same.
A de novo review is not contemplated. 0 7 To require the review-
103. Hudgins, supra note 101, at 47.
104. See discussion in note 87 supra.
105. It has been held that a statute authorizing suspension and/or ex-
pulsion is not unconstitutional because it fails to provide a right to appeal.
The court held the student had a common law right of certiorari. Linwood
v. Bd. of Educ., City of Peoria, 463 F.2d 763 (7th Cir. 1972), cert. denied,
409 U.S. 1027 (1972).
106. Cf. Interview with John Westrick, supra note 93.
107. While it has been suggested in several cases that it is a proper func-
tion of the reviewing officer to review the sufficiency of the evidence pre-
sented in the fact finding hearing, such a review is not proposed here. See
ing officer 08 to redecide the merits of the case would create an
undue burden on the educational process. The due process clause
does not require that a student have two hearings on the merits.
It only requires that due process be complied with initially.
Accordingly, the determination to be made in a suspension of three
days or less would be whether the school disciplinarian complied
with Goss.10 9 For suspensions in excess of three days the determi-
nation is whether the disciplinarian confirmed the accusation with
the accuser after having confronted the student and obtained his
version of the situation.
If a review is sought by the student, the school disciplinarian
would be notified as would the reviewing officer. The notice to
the reviewing officer from the student should contain his reason
for seeking review, including the relevant facts of the case. The
disciplinarian would prepare a statement setting forth the facts of
the case and the steps taken, including names of all parties having
knowledge of the facts.110 The reviewing officer would then de-
termine if the required due process procedure had been followed
and decide the issue accordingly. Should a discrepancy in the two
reports occur, the reviewing officer should contact all the material
parties involved and resolve the conflict on the basis of his inde-
pendent investigation.1 ' In some cases the reviewing officer may
find it necessary to call the parties before him to resolve the con-
flict. This would be necessary, if at all, only in cases of extreme
conflicts in the evidence. Thus, the review would not place such
a burden on school officials as to interfere with the educational
process.
A review of the fact finding hearing is not a foolproof pro-
cedure.1 2 Yet, it is anticipated the thrust of a review would insure
Black Students of North Fort Myer Jr.-Sr. High v. Williams, 470 F.2d 957
(5th Cir. 1972).
108. This officer may be the assistant superintendent, a district adminis-
trator specifically appointed to review these cases, or the school board itself.
109. Goss did not limit the fact finding hearing to the minimum proce-
dure established. Accordingly, it may be proper for the student or his par-
ents to seek a review to determine if the disciplinarian abused his discretion
by failing to employ a more formal hearing procedure.
110. The same information should be included in the notice to the parents
informing them of the suspension. Thus the disciplinarian may as a matter
of course send a copy of the notice to the reviewing officer at the time of
parental notification.
111. See Lee v. Macon County Bd. of Educ., 490 F.2d 458 (5th Cir. 1974).
"Formalistic acceptance or ratification of the principal's request or recom-
mendation . . . without independent Board consideration . . . is less than
due process." Id. at 460.
112. Cf. Sullivan v. Houston Independent School Dist., 475 F.2d 1071 (5th
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fair play at the school level. With notification to the parents being
mandatory, the school disciplinarian will be put on notice that his
action will be subject to the parents' review. If questions concern-
ing the "fairness" of the procedures involved in the suspension arise
in the parents' mind, their right to seek a review increases the effec-
tiveness of the coercive value of the review procedure.11 3
CONCLUSION
The Goss decision, by ending the debate concerning the applicabil-
ity of the due process clause to school disciplinary proceedings has
brought a degree of stability and certainty to the law of student
rights. The student after Goss can expect that prior to any suspen-
sion being imposed upon him, he will have an opportunity to
present his side of the story. While the Court directs its efforts
towards the prevention of unfair and mistaken suspensions, it does
not go far enough.
Working within the same limiting framework imposed by the
Court prior to establishing its minimum standard, this commentator
proposes a new standard. This new standard is directed at th
suspension with a duration in excess of three days. Based on the
increased harm which may result from greater absence from school,
additional safeguards must be employed to prevent mistaken sus-
pensions. A main goal of the proposed standard is to transform
the expectancy of due process under Goss into a, reality. By re-
quiring notice of the suspension and the grounds upon which it
is based be sent to the parents and the right to seek a review of
the school disciplinarian's action, this transformation can be accom-
plished.
WILLTAM R. FLETcHER
Cir. 1973), where the court found that two subsequent de novo hearings
with counsel present cured the lack of due process in the initial suspension
proceeding.
113. See Hudgins, supra note 101.
